Federico Guzman documentary on megamining in Zacatecas, Mexico. See also his thesis book.
Appalachia (/ˌæpəˈlætʃə/ or /ˈæpəˈleɪtʃə/) is a cultural region in the Eastern United States that stretches from the Southern Tier of New York to northern Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia. While the Appalachian Mountains stretch from Belle Isle in Canada to Cheaha Mountain in Alabama, the cultural region of Appalachia typically refers only to the central and southern portions of the range. As of the 2010 census, the region was home to approximately 25 million people, containing the major cities of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Knoxville, Tennessee; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; and Asheville, North Carolina.
Since its recognition as a distinctive region in the late 19th century, Appalachia has been a source of enduring myths and distortions regarding the isolation, temperament, and behavior of its inhabitants. Early 20th century writers often engaged in yellow journalism focused on sensationalistic aspects of the region’s culture, such as moonshining and clan feuding, and often portrayed the region’s inhabitants as uneducated and prone to impulsive acts of violence. Sociological studies in the 1960s and 1970s helped to re-examine and dispel these stereotypes.
While endowed with abundant natural resources, Appalachia has long struggled and been associated with poverty. In the early 20th century, large-scale logging and coal mining firms brought wage-paying jobs and modern amenities to Appalachia, but by the 1960s the region had failed to capitalize on any long-term benefits from these two industries. Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government sought to alleviate poverty in the Appalachian region with a series of New Deal initiatives, such as the construction of dams to provide cheap electricity and the implementation of better farming practices. On March 9, 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission was created to further alleviate poverty in the region, mainly by diversifying the region’s economy and helping to provide better health care and educational opportunities to the region’s inhabitants. By 1990, Appalachia had largely joined the economic mainstream, but still lagged behind the rest of the nation in most economic indicators.
The pit is the hole in the ground and all it’s associated tunnels and underground spaces. The mine is the pit, plus the buildings and operations above ground, such as repair shops, material processing conveyors and towers, and processing plants. In very small operations, the pit and the mine are the same , but in larger operations there is the pit plus additional buildings and structures that are collectively called ‘the mine’. Source
A quarry is a place from which dimension stone, rock, construction aggregate, riprap, sand, gravel, or slate has been excavated from the ground. A quarry is the same thing as an open-pit mine from which minerals are extracted. The only trivial difference between the two is that open-pit mines that produce building materials and dimension stone are commonly referred to as quarries.
Heuersdorf was a village in the Leipzig lowlands, Saxony, Germany. The area of the village belongs to the city of Leipzig since 2004. After a long but ultimately futile resistance of the inhabitants since 1935 the village was evacuated and devastated. See bellow the description, taken from www.heuersdorf.de, illustrates the struggle:
The villagers were forced to accept financial assistance offered by MIBRAG to move from Heuersdorf, since they did not have the monetary resources for resisting the evacuation by legal means. For many years, younger adults refused such enticements to leave their homeland. They were raising families and wanted to preserve the village and its community values. However, any further refusal to give up their homes would now lead to forced eviction and unendurable financial losses. Contrary to the declared intention of the state government of Saxony to keep the village community intact, people from Heuersdorf have been resettled at more than a dozen different locations. The singular interest of MIBRAG over the years was directed at coercing individual families out of the village, eroding human bonds and heightening the insecurity of those inhabitants remaining
In 2007 the regional legislature approved plans to dig up the remaining town to get at some 50 million tons of lignite, or brown coal, to supply a nearby power station. Village authorities fought the plan for years but lost their appeal in Germany’s Constitutional Court in 2005. Most of Heuersdorf’s 320 residents were resettled, most of them farmers and/or retirees. In addition to individual compensation, one important fact deserve to be remarked. An important element of the local cultural heritage was also relocated: a 700-year-old Romanesque-style stone church. As part of the negotiations, the Mibrag mining company spent $4.2 million to move the church from their original location in Heuersdorf to the near town of Borna.
This operation represents a good example of engineering masterpiece, but also of cultural heritage conservation. It is also an example of how social cohesion is linked to such heritage. Any threat to this heritage is, therefore, a threat to the community itself:
Die große Reise einer kleinen Kirche; The long journey of a little church” (2007). Leipziger Universitätsverlag. Leipzig.
A Holy Journey: Church Moved to Make Way for Coal Mine. (2007, October 24). Spiegel. Retrieved August 24, 2015, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-holy-journey-church-moved-to-make-way-for-coal-mine-a-513286.html
Conversation with Prof. Dr. Sigrun Kabisch, Head of the Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ).
Heuersdorf. Geschichte und Abschied eines mitteldeutschen Dorfes. Pro Leipzig Verlag, Leipzig 2009, ISBN 978-3-936508-36-9
The Miner Plan showered tens of millions of euros on the struggling mining regions
But it failed to foment job-generating alternatives to coal of in León, Teruel and Córdoba
The Marta harks back to better times. This locomotive, built in France in 1884, should be pulling a period train right now, taking tourists through the Valley of Guadiato (Córdoba) and reverting the economic decline of this mining area.
In 2008, the Socialist mayor of Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo, Luisa Ruiz, presented the train project and claimed it would be operational by 2011. The Industry Ministry funded the restoration with a 1.4 million-euro subsidy – and that was just for phase one of the project. The money came from the Miner Plan, a fund for the economic reconversion of mining areas following the decline of coal. The Guadiato Valley tourist train was going to create 10 jobs, at a total cost of 14 million euros.
But these days, the Marta is gathering dust inside a municipal warehouse, itself a vestige of a time when the French Mining and Metallurgy Society of Peñarroya (SMMP) extracted coal out of this mountainous area in Córdoba province. There is no longer any mining activity in the town and coal production in the province as a whole has dropped from 1.1 million tons in 1997, when the subsidy plan began, to 520,000 tons in 2010. But there are no alternatives.
Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo, which is now governed by the conservative Popular Party (PP), says there is no money to complete the train restoration, and officials have filed a complaint with the Civil Guard over the alleged wrongful use of the mining subsidies. Three arrests have been made and around 10 people are under scrutiny in a court investigation into the case.
The Civil Guard has also expanded its investigation to other mining subsidies in Peñarroya. Not far from the warehouse that holds the Marta, there is a residence for people with psychological disabilities. It was built by the city using three million euros in mining funds. Construction work was completed in 2010, but the building is empty: there are no patients and no caregivers. The grey, modern-looking center sticks out like a sore thumb among all the classic stand-alone homes that housed the French engineers a century ago.
On the outskirts of town, there is yet another example of a useless investment of public funds. Inside the Antolín III industrial park, the only green shoots in sight are those growing on the brambles that cover the lots. Not a single company has ever settled down here. Next door is a tire recycling plant that also received financial support from the Miner Plan, but subsequently shut down. There is graffiti on the walls about employees not getting paid.
The recycling plant and the residence both sport a sign with the emblem of the Institute for Coal Mining Restructuring and Alternative Development of the Mining Regions, an agency that answers to the Industry Ministry.
Since the late 1990s, this government body has showered millions of euros on Spain’s mining areas. Figures to 2006 (the latest year available on its website) show that 227.9 million euros was spent on building industrial parks. Many of them have no tenants. Meanwhile, the number of coal miners has declined from 50,000 in the 1980s to around 5,000 today. During that time, coal production fell from 36 million tons to six million tons in 2012.
“Transportation infrastructure and collective equipment were created, but they are lying idle. Industrial parks are empty and mining museums barely get any visitors,” notes Paz Benito, a geography professor at León University who has studied the effects of the Miner Plan in the area. “Investment has been random, with short-term vision.”
Some 750 kilometers from here, in Teruel province, a small town called Andorra built an industrial park made to measure for two businesses that were going to create much-needed jobs for its 8,000 residents, following the closure of the mines. The companies set to open here were a cement plant owned by the multinational Cemex and a branch of Castelo, a maker of prefabricated architectural elements.
On a recent day, a loud group of construction workers were taking the Castelo plant apart – it was operational for no more than a few months. Metal parts are scattered around the red-and-white building that briefly contained state-of-the-art facilities. Meanwhile, the cement works cost 84 million euros to build (of which seven million were subsidies) and currently employs a maintenance crew of two. The plant never actually opened. A Cemex spokeswoman said that, given the situation, there are no current plans for this concrete giant.
Andorra has had no mines since 2005, but it continues to live off coal. And it has failed to find alternative activities despite the public funds. The cement works was stillborn, and the dozen or so businesses that went up with public money have all left. The industrial park of La Estación, so named because it is located in the same place where the coal-filled wagons used to stop, has become a training field for all the local sports clubs.
Of the 22 billion euros in public funds handed out to the mining sector since 1990, according to the Industry Ministry, most has gone to mining companies and early retirement packages. But the 2006-2012 coal plan also financed “the transition of mining areas toward economic activities with greater added value and greater quality of human resources.” This involved investing 250 million euros a year in infrastructure (including new industrial parks) and 150 million for entrepreneurial projects. All sources consulted by this newspaper agreed that the project has met with little success and lacked proper oversight.
Jesús Magadán is sitting in his office at the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) labor union headquarters in Ponferrada (León). He figures that in 20 years, the number of miners in this area has declined from 2,800 to 650. He also talks about companies that were created with Miner funds: “Comonor and LM [makers of wind turbines], Inoxidables del Noroeste… I can’t recall any one business that is doing well.”
The solar panel maker Cel Celis opened in 2010 after a 35-million-euro investment (six of which was public money). The inauguration was attended by the deputy premier of the regional government of Castilla y León, Tomás Villanueva. On January 19, the Industry Ministry published a note in the Official State Gazette indicating that it was revoking the aid. The decision was published here after authorities found it impossible to contact the company, which is still operational although production has ground to a halt. No solar panels are being sold.
The same issue of the gazette included 15 other cases of subsidies that were being revoked from Teruel-based businesses whose managers could not be contacted. There was a ham de-boning firm (400,000 euros in aid), a three-star hotel that was never built (393,000 euros), and a sausage factory that only functioned for two years (527,000 euros).
In the last year alone, the ministry has opened inquiries on around 100 companies whose owners have gone missing, and who had either received or were set to receive a collective 50 million euros between 2007 and 2010.
There are infrastructures, decent roads that reach remote locations and industrial parks around every corner ready to accept new corporate tenants. But there are few actual jobs.
In 2011, CCOO published a report assessing the investment plan during the 2006-2008 period: “Of the 8,789 jobs promised nationwide, only 514 were created, while 4,215 were lost [due to the drop in coal production].”
Magadán insists that the program was not poorly designed, but it just failed to work because of the crisis and the energy policies of the PP government. “The wind energy firms once employed thousands of people in León and now they barely have a few hundred workers,” explains this 49-year-old who spent a quarter of a century working in a mine. He adds that it is not easy to attract businesses to geographically isolated locations.
Thirty kilometers south of Ponferrada, in Brañuelas, Benjamín Geijo, mayor since 1979 of a village that now has 400 residents, complains about the “feeling of helplessness watching my village go downhill, and knowing that it is very hard to do something about it. There used to be 17 bars and now there are just two left.”
Funded projects that failed
The following are some of the failed projects that received millions of euros in funding from the Industry Ministry to transform the economies of mining areas.
– Six million for solar panels. The Cel Celis solar panel manufacturer opened in 2010 in San Román de Bembibre (León), after an investment of 35 million euros (six million of which came from the Miner Plan). The company is now negotiating with creditors to avoid filing for bankruptcy. On January 19, the Industry Ministry announced in the Official Gazette that it was initiating proceedings to revoke state aid from a company that was originally going to create 150 jobs in the area.
– 3.5 million for medicine. In 2002 the ministry approved 3.47 million euros in aid to the pharmaceutical company Diasa Pharma, which was going to invest 8.67 million in a new plant in Turón (Asturias), providing jobs for 90 people. The company committed to maintaining those jobs through to October 2010, but in May 2009 it had a meeting of creditors and is already being liquidated, according to the local press.
– 31 million for a photovoltaic plant. Silicio Solar, a unit of a Ukrainian company, received 20.9 million euros in 2007. The plant, which was located in Puertollano (Ciudad Real), also secured 10 million in regional funds released by the Economy Ministry. It became the largest photovoltaic manufacturing plant in Spain, with nearly 500 employees. Industry sources said it shut down last December.
– 2.1 million for prefabs. In 2009, the Galician company Castelo, which makes prefabricated architectural elements, opened up its most modern plant in Andorra (Teruel) and shut it down in December 2010. It received 2.1 million euros in aid in 2007 and only created 25 out of the 100 jobs it promised.
Geijo speaks inside a restaurant near the A-6 motorway, a favorite stop for truck drivers. Brañuelas never had any mines, but it did have the train station for the coal that came out of the mountains.
Geijo, a Socialist, recalls that the mining funds allowed him to build a seniors’ residence, a business incubator and an industrial park. The only tenant in it is a company owned by Magín Fernández Feliz, 63, who treats granite and slate for use in cemeteries and roofings. “I didn’t get Miner funds, and I almost prefer it that way,” he says. Although he once had up to 12 workers, the staff is now down to himself and his business partner. But Fernández Feliz hopes that an upcoming deal to send slate panels to Germany will reactivate production.
“What should be getting reconverted around here are the people, rather than the region. The miners are retiring early with good pensions and they don’t like to take any risks. They pay for their children’s studies and help them leave the area, but they don’t invest their money. If someone wants to get this land back on its feet, it’s got to be us – we can’t wait for the Japanese, the Germans or the Americans to come do the harvest in our place,” he says.
The region of Aragón has received 350 million euros in state funds for infrastructure and 76 million more for business ventures over the course of 15 years. The regional industry commissioner, Arturo Aliaga of the nationalist Aragonese party PAR, says matters have been conducted “exquisitely” and blames the crisis for wiping out the businesses that came to Teruel through the Miner Plan.
But he underscores another hurdle to reconversion: social pressure from the mining areas to bring projects to their villages. “Did Andorra need three industrial parks? If we hadn’t built them, they would’ve killed us. Ask the man who was mayor then, from the United Left.”
In Ariño (Teruel), with a population of 900, it has been 10 years since the first stone was laid for the spa that was going to turn the local economy around. But the wellness center was never finished, and the village is still dependent on coal. Mayor Joaquín Noe goes down to the mine every day. Carlos Luna, a Socialist councilor and a miner until he recently retired, still has his hopes pinned on the spa project, which is supposed to employ around 30 people once it is up and running. “The Miner Plan was not shared out properly; it was every man for himself, and things can’t work that way,” he says.
Yolanda Casaus, a Socialist councilor for Andorra and a congresswoman for two terms during which she focused on coal issues believes that the main problem was “planning, which was more aimed at individual villages than at the whole.”
The subsidies are handed out by a group of around 20 individuals representing the regional and local governments and the unions. This group, known as Mesa de la Minería, meets at the request of the regional government, after projects have been run through a technical committee.
But Casaus feels that these meetings, which could go on for hours, were never fully transparent, leading to the approval of a few initiatives “that did not make a lot of sense for a territory like Teruel. Aragón has built industrial parks to grow poppies.”
Naturally, not all subsidized companies have collapsed. Casting Ros, in Utrillas (Teruel), makes auto parts and has become the driving force in the region. In this case, subsidies – including some from the Miner Plan – were essential to its survival. In 2008, Casting Ros had 500 workers, but a drop in production has reduced the staff to around 300.
“The funds did not produce an obvious result,” says Paz Benito, the geography professor from León University. “While I wouldn’t say they were a failure, it is obvious that they did not stem the economic apathy or the depopulation drive.”
Julio Lago, who teaches economics at the same university, had this to say to anyone attempting to obtain hard data on the Miner Plan’s results: “I tried to do a study, but when I asked the Coal Institute for figures, they didn’t give them to me. So good luck with that.”
Fermín Rodríguez, director of a center at Oviedo University, also came up with a project to evaluate the subsidy program, but says the ministry did not seem overly enthusiastic. He remembers that at the beginning of the Miner Plan, mayors would ask and the Industry Ministry would provide: “One wanted a bowling alley, another a drinking trough. It hasn’t been a model of good management.”
A source who worked at the ministry a few years ago explains how the Miner Plan was viewed from the inside: “The regions and the unions would present their projects, and the ministry would pay and look the other way. Nobody wants an assessment of that program because it is not in anybody’s interests that one be carried out.”
But the United Left coalition in León insists on an audit. “There have been subsidy hunters; companies that opened up, operated for the shortest possible time, then shut down without any control,” says Santiago Ordóñez, the coalition coordinator in the province. “Neither the Socialists nor the PP nor the unions want to analyze what happened to the money.”
Some time ago I published a post on ontology in order to explain why it is important for any research project. There I emphasized the difference between adopting a objectivist and subjectivist ontological position. The former focuses on the formal structure of the organization under study, usually via quantitative methods, while the latter do it on the informal structure (i.e. one assumes the condition of social actors of the organizational member). Hence qualitative methods are usually more connected.
This is actually a dilemma that I have dealt with in my PhD project. As I mentioned in the past, the topic of my dissertation was the social impact of a large scale mining industry in a rural area. The research question was What social changes in the community around are associated with such development? Adopting a subjectivist approach I would have taken into priority the discourse of social actors involved, i.e. neighbors, politicians, associations representatives etc. The point here would be studying how social actors have experienced the phenomena under study. On the contrary, under a objectivist approach, I would have avoid this and focus on statistics in order to analyze, for instance, evolution of employment or social disruption indicators such as divorce or suicide rate. The point here is to come up with objective indicators of the social change. The truth is that I did a kind of combination of both, since I consider that both could enrich the research process. Social actors perception provided me with good insights that later on would give way to hypothesis to be tested via qualitative methods. But the truth is that it took me a while to distinguish between both perspectives, as well as realized which one better fit for my research.
This dilemma came to my mind this morning when reading this interesting announcement about a workshop on ontology. I would just like to paste here the content and provide you with a further details link.
Ontology can often prove a contested and confusing issue within social research. Everyone has on ontology, explicit or otherwise, but the process of drawing this out and thinking through its implications for research can often be a confusing part of the PhD process. This participatory workshop explores the practical significance of ontological questions for social research, inviting participants to reflect on their own research projects in a collaborative and supportive context. It aims to help participants negotiate the sometimes abstruse matter of social ontology, linking theory to practice in the context of their own research projects. The main focus throughout the day will be on how ontological questions are encountered in social research, the questions posed by such encounters and how engaging explicitly with social ontology can often help resolve such issues.
All participants will offer a brief (5 minute) presentation of their research project and the ontological questions which have been or are expected to be encountered within it. Those still early in the PhD process are welcome to substitute this for a discussion of their research interests and potential project. We’d like to ask all participants to reflect in advance on their own social ontology and how it pertains to their project. Uncertainty here is not a problem, in fact it will be a useful contribution to discussions on the day!
We also invite two more substantial presentations (10 mins) for the first afternoon session, reflecting on your engagement with ontological questions in your own project in order to help begin a practical engagement which encompasses the entire group. If you would be interested in leading the discussion in this way then please make this known when registering.
To register please contact email@example.com with a brief description of your research and your interest in social ontology (500 words or less). The event is free but places are limited. Travel bursaries are available, please ask for more details.
The Centre for Social Ontology