Tag Archives: post-mining regions

European Coal Map (video)


Church removal: coal mining, cultural heritage and social cohesion

Heuersdorf  was a village in the Leipzig lowlands, Saxony, Germany. The area of the village belongs to the city of Leipzig since 2004. After a long but ultimately futile resistance of the inhabitants since 1935 the village was evacuated and devastated. See bellow the description, taken from www.heuersdorf.de, illustrates the struggle:

The villagers were forced to accept financial assistance offered by MIBRAG to move from Heuersdorf, since they did not have the monetary resources for resisting the evacuation by legal means. For many years, younger adults refused such enticements to leave their homeland. They were raising families and wanted to preserve the village and its community values. However, any further refusal to give up their homes would now lead to forced eviction and unendurable financial losses. Contrary to the declared intention of the state government of Saxony to keep the village community intact, people from Heuersdorf have been resettled at more than a dozen different locations. The singular interest of MIBRAG over the years was directed at coercing individual families out of the village, eroding human bonds and heightening the insecurity of those inhabitants remaining

In 2007 the regional legislature approved plans to dig up the remaining town to get at some 50 million tons of lignite, or brown coal, to supply a nearby power station. Village authorities fought the plan for years but lost their appeal in Germany’s Constitutional Court in 2005. Most of Heuersdorf’s 320 residents were resettled, most of them farmers and/or retirees. In addition to individual compensation, one important fact deserve to be remarked. An important element of the local cultural heritage was also relocated: a 700-year-old Romanesque-style stone church. As part of the negotiations, the Mibrag mining company spent $4.2 million to move the church from their original location in Heuersdorf  to the near town of Borna.


This operation represents a good example of engineering masterpiece, but also of cultural heritage conservation. It is also an example of how social cohesion is linked to such heritage. Any threat to this heritage is, therefore, a threat to the community itself:


Die große Reise einer kleinen Kirche; The long journey of a little church” (2007). Leipziger Universitätsverlag. Leipzig.

A Holy Journey: Church Moved to Make Way for Coal Mine. (2007, October 24). Spiegel. Retrieved August 24, 2015, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-holy-journey-church-moved-to-make-way-for-coal-mine-a-513286.html

Conversation with Prof. Dr. Sigrun Kabisch, Head of the Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ).

Heuersdorf. Geschichte und Abschied eines mitteldeutschen Dorfes. Pro Leipzig Verlag, Leipzig 2009, ISBN 978-3-936508-36-9


Socio-spatial differentiation in southern Leipzig post-mining area

Bellow it is showed the three types of communities (Kabisch, 2004) adjacent to the coal mine, now pit lakes, in the southern leizig.

Rural villages: Dreiskau-Muckern (469 inh. in 2014), Oelzchau (610 inh. in 2014), Pötzschau (374 inh. in 2014), Mölbis (515 inh. in 2014), Störmthal (512), Auenhain , Wachau, Güldengossa (394 inh. in 2014): High satisfaction with the housing conditions regarding the apartment, very high satisfaction with the local living conditions (share of respondents who would recommend a good friend to move to their community), quiet location, attractive surroundings, pleasant social atmosphere, close to future recreation areas. (TOTAL POPULATION. APPROX: 4.000 inhabitants)

These communities are characterised by a relatively large proportion of farmers and farming employees, the other inhabitants working in the mining industry. The level of qualification is relatively low, while the average age is relatively high. Others: out-migration of younger, well-educated inhabitants during the last few decades. The main burden affecting these communities was their classification as “mining protection areas”. Although this classification was abolished after 1990, the local population suddently had to face new worries such as unemployment and early retirement.

Suburbs: Markkleeberg-Ost, Grossstädteln: hight satisfaction with the local housing conditions regarding the apartment, very high satisfaction with the local living conditions (share of respondents who would recommend a good friend to move to their community), quiet location, close to the city of Leipzig, varied infraestructures, good transport links, close to future recreation area.

Relatively high level of qualifications and higher household income among the inhabitants. Urban morphology: detached family housing. Most of the employees work in the city of Leipzig. Consequently, the collapse of the brown-coal industry did not affect these inhabitants to the same extent as the residents of the other community types. No out-migration tendency.

Small towns affected by industry: Gaschwitz (671 inh. in 2014), Grossdeuben, Rötha (3,704 inh. in 2014), Espenhain (2,267 inh. in 2014): Low satisfaction with housing conditions, very low satisfaction with the local living conditions (share of respondents who would recommend a good friend to move to their community), close to the city of Leipzig, good transport links, poor infraestructures, vehicle pollution, devastated landscape, buildings in bad state of repair. TOTAL POPULATION: APPROX: 7.000 inhabitants.

Most of the inhabitants worked in the former brown-coal industry. The majority of the residents rent flats in three-or four-storey blocks owned by the industrial enterprises. In this small towns, the collapse of the brown-coal industry led to social disaster, with unemployment suddenly mushrooming. High unemployment has persisted, despite the migration of sections of the population.


Kabisch, S. (2004). Revitalisation chances for communities in post-mining landscapes. Peckiana, 3, 87-99.

“The shrinking mining city: urban dynamics and contested territory” by Martinez-Fernandez (2012)


Shrinking mining cities — once prosperous settlements servicing a mining site or a system of mining sites — are characterized by long-term population and/or economic decline. Many of these towns experience periods of growth and shrinkage, mirroring the ebbs and flows of international mineral markets which determine the fortunes of the dominant mining corporation upon which each of these towns heavily depends. This dependence on one main industry produces a parallel development in the fluctuations of both workforce and population. Thus, the strategies of the main company in these towns can, to a great extent, determine future developments and have a great impact on urban management plans. Climate conditions, knowledge, education and health services, as well as transportation links, are important factors that have impacted on lifestyles in mining cities, but it is the parallel development with the private sector operators (often a single corporation) that constitutes the distinctive feature of these cities and that ultimately defines their shrinkage. This article discusses shrinking mining cities in capitalist economies, the factors underpinning their development, and some of the planning and community challenges faced by these cities in Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico.

Tagebau Hambach, a large scale mine in Elsdorf (Germany)

Open pit located in Elsdorf is a town in the Rhein-Erft-Kreis, in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. It is situated approximately 5 km south-west of Bergheim and 30 km west of Cologne.

30.000 people were displaced


170 km2 were recovered for agricultural use


Reference: Aréchaga Rodríguez, F. (2013) “La influencia de la actividad extractiva de materias primas en el desarrollo económico y social de un pais”. Jornada de reflexión (Galicia). Confedem. Santiago de Compostela

More info (in German)

Largest Open-pit Mines in The World

Sinking money into a pit

The Miner Plan showered tens of millions of euros on the struggling mining regions
But it failed to foment job-generating alternatives to coal of in León, Teruel and Córdoba

El poblado industrial de Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo (Córdoba), de principios del siglo XX, comprado por el Ayuntamiento con fondos mineros. / JUAN MANUEL VACAS

The Marta harks back to better times. This locomotive, built in France in 1884, should be pulling a period train right now, taking tourists through the Valley of Guadiato (Córdoba) and reverting the economic decline of this mining area.

In 2008, the Socialist mayor of Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo, Luisa Ruiz, presented the train project and claimed it would be operational by 2011. The Industry Ministry funded the restoration with a 1.4 million-euro subsidy – and that was just for phase one of the project. The money came from the Miner Plan, a fund for the economic reconversion of mining areas following the decline of coal. The Guadiato Valley tourist train was going to create 10 jobs, at a total cost of 14 million euros.

But these days, the Marta is gathering dust inside a municipal warehouse, itself a vestige of a time when the French Mining and Metallurgy Society of Peñarroya (SMMP) extracted coal out of this mountainous area in Córdoba province. There is no longer any mining activity in the town and coal production in the province as a whole has dropped from 1.1 million tons in 1997, when the subsidy plan began, to 520,000 tons in 2010. But there are no alternatives.

Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo, which is now governed by the conservative Popular Party (PP), says there is no money to complete the train restoration, and officials have filed a complaint with the Civil Guard over the alleged wrongful use of the mining subsidies. Three arrests have been made and around 10 people are under scrutiny in a court investigation into the case.

The Civil Guard has also expanded its investigation to other mining subsidies in Peñarroya. Not far from the warehouse that holds the Marta, there is a residence for people with psychological disabilities. It was built by the city using three million euros in mining funds. Construction work was completed in 2010, but the building is empty: there are no patients and no caregivers. The grey, modern-looking center sticks out like a sore thumb among all the classic stand-alone homes that housed the French engineers a century ago.

On the outskirts of town, there is yet another example of a useless investment of public funds. Inside the Antolín III industrial park, the only green shoots in sight are those growing on the brambles that cover the lots. Not a single company has ever settled down here. Next door is a tire recycling plant that also received financial support from the Miner Plan, but subsequently shut down. There is graffiti on the walls about employees not getting paid.

Carlos Luna, a miner from Ariño, in the shuttered spa in his town. / DAVID ASENSSIO

Peñarroya-Pueblonuevo, a town of 11,000, has received around 26 million euros from the Miner Plan over the last 15 years. The current mayor, María Gil of the PP, says she cannot comment on the ongoing investigation. The former mayor, Ruiz, who was arrested and released but still faces charges, declined to talk to EL PAÍS for this story.

The recycling plant and the residence both sport a sign with the emblem of the Institute for Coal Mining Restructuring and Alternative Development of the Mining Regions, an agency that answers to the Industry Ministry.

Since the late 1990s, this government body has showered millions of euros on Spain’s mining areas. Figures to 2006 (the latest year available on its website) show that 227.9 million euros was spent on building industrial parks. Many of them have no tenants. Meanwhile, the number of coal miners has declined from 50,000 in the 1980s to around 5,000 today. During that time, coal production fell from 36 million tons to six million tons in 2012.

“Transportation infrastructure and collective equipment were created, but they are lying idle. Industrial parks are empty and mining museums barely get any visitors,” notes Paz Benito, a geography professor at León University who has studied the effects of the Miner Plan in the area. “Investment has been random, with short-term vision.”

Some 750 kilometers from here, in Teruel province, a small town called Andorra built an industrial park made to measure for two businesses that were going to create much-needed jobs for its 8,000 residents, following the closure of the mines. The companies set to open here were a cement plant owned by the multinational Cemex and a branch of Castelo, a maker of prefabricated architectural elements.

On a recent day, a loud group of construction workers were taking the Castelo plant apart – it was operational for no more than a few months. Metal parts are scattered around the red-and-white building that briefly contained state-of-the-art facilities. Meanwhile, the cement works cost 84 million euros to build (of which seven million were subsidies) and currently employs a maintenance crew of two. The plant never actually opened. A Cemex spokeswoman said that, given the situation, there are no current plans for this concrete giant.

Andorra has had no mines since 2005, but it continues to live off coal. And it has failed to find alternative activities despite the public funds. The cement works was stillborn, and the dozen or so businesses that went up with public money have all left. The industrial park of La Estación, so named because it is located in the same place where the coal-filled wagons used to stop, has become a training field for all the local sports clubs.

Of the 22 billion euros in public funds handed out to the mining sector since 1990, according to the Industry Ministry, most has gone to mining companies and early retirement packages. But the 2006-2012 coal plan also financed “the transition of mining areas toward economic activities with greater added value and greater quality of human resources.” This involved investing 250 million euros a year in infrastructure (including new industrial parks) and 150 million for entrepreneurial projects. All sources consulted by this newspaper agreed that the project has met with little success and lacked proper oversight.

Jesús Magadán is sitting in his office at the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) labor union headquarters in Ponferrada (León). He figures that in 20 years, the number of miners in this area has declined from 2,800 to 650. He also talks about companies that were created with Miner funds: “Comonor and LM [makers of wind turbines], Inoxidables del Noroeste… I can’t recall any one business that is doing well.”

A cement plant that never opened in the town of Andorra (Teruel). / DAVIS ASENSIO

Most of the companies shut down after receiving the subsidies and having remained open for five years, the minimum required by the Plan to ensure the money does not have to be returned.

The solar panel maker Cel Celis opened in 2010 after a 35-million-euro investment (six of which was public money). The inauguration was attended by the deputy premier of the regional government of Castilla y León, Tomás Villanueva. On January 19, the Industry Ministry published a note in the Official State Gazette indicating that it was revoking the aid. The decision was published here after authorities found it impossible to contact the company, which is still operational although production has ground to a halt. No solar panels are being sold.

The same issue of the gazette included 15 other cases of subsidies that were being revoked from Teruel-based businesses whose managers could not be contacted. There was a ham de-boning firm (400,000 euros in aid), a three-star hotel that was never built (393,000 euros), and a sausage factory that only functioned for two years (527,000 euros).

In the last year alone, the ministry has opened inquiries on around 100 companies whose owners have gone missing, and who had either received or were set to receive a collective 50 million euros between 2007 and 2010.

“It doesn’t make any difference whether [the authorities) ask for their funds back; those are limited corporations that have already disappeared,” warns José Luis Villares, secretary of mining for CCOO, who admits that the re-industrialization of mining areas has failed to work.

There are infrastructures, decent roads that reach remote locations and industrial parks around every corner ready to accept new corporate tenants. But there are few actual jobs.

In 2011, CCOO published a report assessing the investment plan during the 2006-2008 period: “Of the 8,789 jobs promised nationwide, only 514 were created, while 4,215 were lost [due to the drop in coal production].”

Magadán insists that the program was not poorly designed, but it just failed to work because of the crisis and the energy policies of the PP government. “The wind energy firms once employed thousands of people in León and now they barely have a few hundred workers,” explains this 49-year-old who spent a quarter of a century working in a mine. He adds that it is not easy to attract businesses to geographically isolated locations.

Thirty kilometers south of Ponferrada, in Brañuelas, Benjamín Geijo, mayor since 1979 of a village that now has 400 residents, complains about the “feeling of helplessness watching my village go downhill, and knowing that it is very hard to do something about it. There used to be 17 bars and now there are just two left.”

Funded projects that failed

The following are some of the failed projects that received millions of euros in funding from the Industry Ministry to transform the economies of mining areas.

– Six million for solar panels. The Cel Celis solar panel manufacturer opened in 2010 in San Román de Bembibre (León), after an investment of 35 million euros (six million of which came from the Miner Plan). The company is now negotiating with creditors to avoid filing for bankruptcy. On January 19, the Industry Ministry announced in the Official Gazette that it was initiating proceedings to revoke state aid from a company that was originally going to create 150 jobs in the area.

– 3.5 million for medicine. In 2002 the ministry approved 3.47 million euros in aid to the pharmaceutical company Diasa Pharma, which was going to invest 8.67 million in a new plant in Turón (Asturias), providing jobs for 90 people. The company committed to maintaining those jobs through to October 2010, but in May 2009 it had a meeting of creditors and is already being liquidated, according to the local press.

– 31 million for a photovoltaic plant. Silicio Solar, a unit of a Ukrainian company, received 20.9 million euros in 2007. The plant, which was located in Puertollano (Ciudad Real), also secured 10 million in regional funds released by the Economy Ministry. It became the largest photovoltaic manufacturing plant in Spain, with nearly 500 employees. Industry sources said it shut down last December.

– 2.1 million for prefabs. In 2009, the Galician company Castelo, which makes prefabricated architectural elements, opened up its most modern plant in Andorra (Teruel) and shut it down in December 2010. It received 2.1 million euros in aid in 2007 and only created 25 out of the 100 jobs it promised.

Geijo speaks inside a restaurant near the A-6 motorway, a favorite stop for truck drivers. Brañuelas never had any mines, but it did have the train station for the coal that came out of the mountains.

Geijo, a Socialist, recalls that the mining funds allowed him to build a seniors’ residence, a business incubator and an industrial park. The only tenant in it is a company owned by Magín Fernández Feliz, 63, who treats granite and slate for use in cemeteries and roofings. “I didn’t get Miner funds, and I almost prefer it that way,” he says. Although he once had up to 12 workers, the staff is now down to himself and his business partner. But Fernández Feliz hopes that an upcoming deal to send slate panels to Germany will reactivate production.

“What should be getting reconverted around here are the people, rather than the region. The miners are retiring early with good pensions and they don’t like to take any risks. They pay for their children’s studies and help them leave the area, but they don’t invest their money. If someone wants to get this land back on its feet, it’s got to be us – we can’t wait for the Japanese, the Germans or the Americans to come do the harvest in our place,” he says.

The region of Aragón has received 350 million euros in state funds for infrastructure and 76 million more for business ventures over the course of 15 years. The regional industry commissioner, Arturo Aliaga of the nationalist Aragonese party PAR, says matters have been conducted “exquisitely” and blames the crisis for wiping out the businesses that came to Teruel through the Miner Plan.

But he underscores another hurdle to reconversion: social pressure from the mining areas to bring projects to their villages. “Did Andorra need three industrial parks? If we hadn’t built them, they would’ve killed us. Ask the man who was mayor then, from the United Left.”

In Ariño (Teruel), with a population of 900, it has been 10 years since the first stone was laid for the spa that was going to turn the local economy around. But the wellness center was never finished, and the village is still dependent on coal. Mayor Joaquín Noe goes down to the mine every day. Carlos Luna, a Socialist councilor and a miner until he recently retired, still has his hopes pinned on the spa project, which is supposed to employ around 30 people once it is up and running. “The Miner Plan was not shared out properly; it was every man for himself, and things can’t work that way,” he says.

Yolanda Casaus, a Socialist councilor for Andorra and a congresswoman for two terms during which she focused on coal issues believes that the main problem was “planning, which was more aimed at individual villages than at the whole.”

The subsidies are handed out by a group of around 20 individuals representing the regional and local governments and the unions. This group, known as Mesa de la Minería, meets at the request of the regional government, after projects have been run through a technical committee.

But Casaus feels that these meetings, which could go on for hours, were never fully transparent, leading to the approval of a few initiatives “that did not make a lot of sense for a territory like Teruel. Aragón has built industrial parks to grow poppies.”

Naturally, not all subsidized companies have collapsed. Casting Ros, in Utrillas (Teruel), makes auto parts and has become the driving force in the region. In this case, subsidies – including some from the Miner Plan – were essential to its survival. In 2008, Casting Ros had 500 workers, but a drop in production has reduced the staff to around 300.

“The funds did not produce an obvious result,” says Paz Benito, the geography professor from León University. “While I wouldn’t say they were a failure, it is obvious that they did not stem the economic apathy or the depopulation drive.”

Julio Lago, who teaches economics at the same university, had this to say to anyone attempting to obtain hard data on the Miner Plan’s results: “I tried to do a study, but when I asked the Coal Institute for figures, they didn’t give them to me. So good luck with that.”

Fermín Rodríguez, director of a center at Oviedo University, also came up with a project to evaluate the subsidy program, but says the ministry did not seem overly enthusiastic. He remembers that at the beginning of the Miner Plan, mayors would ask and the Industry Ministry would provide: “One wanted a bowling alley, another a drinking trough. It hasn’t been a model of good management.”

A source who worked at the ministry a few years ago explains how the Miner Plan was viewed from the inside: “The regions and the unions would present their projects, and the ministry would pay and look the other way. Nobody wants an assessment of that program because it is not in anybody’s interests that one be carried out.”

But the United Left coalition in León insists on an audit. “There have been subsidy hunters; companies that opened up, operated for the shortest possible time, then shut down without any control,” says Santiago Ordóñez, the coalition coordinator in the province. “Neither the Socialists nor the PP nor the unions want to analyze what happened to the money.”

Original Source

El cártel del carbón aprieta los dientes

El sexteto de grandes mineras que domina el sector mantiene el exceso de oferta
29 MAR 2015 – 00:00 CET

Un trabajador en una mina de carbón de Polonia. / BLOOMBERG  (BARTEK SADOWSKI )

El carbón, más que un mero combustible, es un símbolo. Su ingente presencia en el norte de Europa y la facilidad para transportarlo a través de una ramificada red fluvial cimentaron el desarrollo económico que en Siglo XIX impulsó la revolución industrial europea y estadounidense. Casi dos siglos después, esta energía fósil, en retroceso por sus efectos contaminantes en los países desarrollados pero muy en uso en muchas economías emergentes, sufre como el petróleo el acusado descenso de los precios: su valor se ha reducido un 52% desde 2011.

Y no es la única similitud, pues los grandes grupos empresariales productores de carbón, al igual que los de crudo, han decidido no reducir la explotación a pesar de la menor rentabilidad, con lo cual han expulsado del mercado a los rivales con mayores costes de producción. La jugada, según muchos analistas, es comparable a la que ha puesto en marcha la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP). “Es un mercado poco transparente que se ha poblado de competidores tras la fuerte subida de los precios de 2011. No obstante, las grandes mineras que lideran el sector suelen actuar de manera coordinada, en forma de cartel, como la OPEP. En este caso han elegido no reducir la producción con lo que empujarán a los productores con mayores costes fuera del mercado”, explica Diana Bacila, analista de Nena, una consultora con sede en Oslo. A la cabeza de este núcleo duro del carbón están la anglo-suiza Glencore, las anglo-australianas Rio Tinto y BHP Billiton, la anglo-sudafricana Anglo American, la colombiana Cerrejón, y la colombo-estadounidense Drummond.

La Agencia Internacional de la Energía estima que el carbón aun satisface el 30,1% de las necesidades energéticas mundiales —el petróleo supone el 31%— genera más del 40% de la electricidad global y se utiliza en el 70% de la producción mundial de acero. La explotación de este recurso va, además, en ascenso. El Deutsche Bank calcula que la producción de carbón en el mundo ascenderá este año a 1.083 millones de toneladas, lo que supondrá un incremento de un 1% respecto a 2014. Contrariamente, su consumo bajará un 1%, hasta las 1.053 millones de toneladas. El exceso de oferta alcanzará los 30 millones de toneladas, el triple que el año pasado.

El principal motivo de este exceso de producción es una reducción del consumo de China, principal productor y consumidor del mundo. “El aumento de la generación de energía hidroeléctrica, el impulso que el Gobierno ha dado a la energía nuclear y la aplicación de políticas anticontaminantes más duras ha llevado a China a tener un exceso de oferta doméstica que la ha obligado a modificar su posición en el mercado internacional”, explica Bacila. Los datos del Gobierno chino señalan que en 2014 el país aumentó el consumo de petróleo en un 5.9% y el de gas natural en un 8.6%. El consumo de carbón cayó un 2.5%. A lo largo de 2014, además, Pekín importó 215 millones de toneladas de esta materia prima, un 15% menos que en 2013.

Citigroup ha calculado que la tasa de crecimiento de la demanda de carbón en China en los próximos años será de la mitad que en el pasado lustro. Este ajuste de las importaciones y el aumento de la oferta global es lo que está detrás del desplome en los precios. El análisis del FOB Australia, el índice que se suele tomar como referencia global, revela que el carbón térmico, que se utiliza en la producción de energía, valía en febrero de 2011 147,5 dólares por tonelada y que, en marzo pasado, su valor fue de 59,5 dólares por tonelada. La cotización del carbón metalúrgico, que se utiliza en la producción de acero, valía 378 dólares por tonelada en enero de 2011, casi cuatro veces más que en marzo de este año, cuando su valor ascendió a 100,2 dólares.

“La estrategia de los productores es de alguna forma comparable con la del sector petrolero, aunque no exista ningún cartel formalmente organizado como la OPEP. Desde 2013 hubo un esfuerzo para recortar costes, sobre todo a través reducciones de plantilla y renegociaciones de las condiciones con las empresas subcontratadas, que ha hecho que las compañías de mayor envergadura hayan conseguido mantener su cuota de mercado pese al desplome de los precios. También la fuerte reducción del coste del crudo, en un sector que cuenta con mucha maquinaria alimentada con diésel, ha contribuido a que los altos niveles de producción sigan siendo sostenibles”, asegura Michael Hsueh, analista del Deutsche Bank.

También el fortalecimiento del dólar ha favorecido a la industria. El dólar de Australia, patria de varias de las empresas mineras más importantes del mundo, ha retrocedido cerca de un 8,5% de valor frente al dólar de EE UU y ha permitido a esas firmas consolidar su cuota de mercado gracias al abaratamiento de su carbón. “Las empresas de Rusia y Colombia, dos grandes productores cuya monedas han retrocedido un 50% y un 20% frente al dólar estadounidense, respectivamente, también han obtenido grandes beneficios”, remacha Basila.

Las firmas estadounidenses viven la situación opuesta. El fortalecimiento de su moneda ha mermado la capacidad de las empresas de competir en el mercado internacional. “Los principales yacimientos de carbón, además, se hallan en Wyoming [en el centro del país]. Como las exportaciones de carbón están dirigidas principalmente a Europa, los costes de transporte son elevados”, arguye Andrew Moore, analista del mercado del carbón de EE UU de Platts, la división de energía de la consultora estadounidense McGraw Hill. La situación en el Viejo Continente tampoco favorece a esas empresas. El índice europeo de precios de los contratos negociados con un año de antelación, recopilado por Bloomberg, cayó este mes hasta los 56,60 dólares por tonelada, el precio más bajo desde septiembre de 2007. Solo el año pasado perdió el 29% de su valor.

David Perry, director de servicio de análisis del mercado global del carbón en la consultora IHS Energy, dice que las dificultades para rentabilizar la producción van a persistir por lo menos hasta 2016, “ya que el precio global del carbón se va a mantener estable alrededor de los 60 dólares por tonelada”. El analista arguye que el motivo por el que el exceso de oferta no disminuye es que “cerrar una mina tiene costes muy elevados, tanto en términos objetivos como por la imagen de una empresa. No se trata tanto de querer formar un cartel, sino de no querer ser el primero en disminuir la producción, sobre todo ahora que algunas empresas ha optimizado sus costes hasta en un 20%, o las de Indonesia [otro gran productor] que también han conseguido ahorros significativos”. El futuro, de todas maneras, se vislumbra poco alentador para las empresas de EE UU: “Las minas norteamericanas tienen costes de gestión y laborales muy elevados. Le resultará más difícil permanecer en un mercado tan complicado”, augura Perry.

Fuente original

Seenkompass Leipzig: a macro conversion from open-pit mines to lakes

A total of 42 new lakes will be created by flooding closed open-pit mines and will create a seascape with about 174 km² water surface, especially in the south of Leipzig. The landscape change will have a very significant socieconomic impact on the region. Major economic and leisure development, as well as improvement of quality of life is expected. This macro project is part of the structural change in the region around Leipzig and Halle. (See the animated infography following the pin)

See bellow the original description in Germany: Die Bergbaufolgelandschaft des mitteldeutschen Braunkohlereviers ist mit ca. 500 km² wiedernutzbar zu machender Fläche die drittgrößte Deutschlands. Mit der Rekultivierung der stillgelegten Tagebaue vollzieht sich hier seit 1990 ein eindrucksvoller Wandel hin zu einer Seenlandschaft mit vielfältigen Erholungsmöglichkeiten. Gewinnen Sie einen Überblick über die Entwicklung der Seenlandschaft, indem Sie Zeitsprünge des Flutungsstandes auswählen Erkunden Sie Details zu einzelnen Gewässern, indem Sie auf einen See in der Karte klicken oder in das Textfeld eingeben.

Why and where early retirees move? A post-mining town case study (my abstract for the next European Sociological Association conference in Prague)

Problem and research question Mining industries have played a crucial part in the European history. Starting in the 19th century, the extraction of coal and lignite provided the basis for the industrialization of many European regions (Wirth et al, 2012). Due to exhaustion of resources or technical and market conditions changes, mining industry has been retreating since 1960s in central Europe and since 1990s in Eastern and Southern Europe. In the particular case of Spain and according to a mining institution attached to the Ministry of Industry, in 2012 there were 79 mining municipalities “very affected” by mining restructuring. In order to avoid the “socioeconomic drama” (Baeten et al, 1999) that usually accompanied this process, these municipalities have been benefited from revitalization policies from public institutions, such as early retirement plans, employment incentives and grants to attract investors, among other measures. This papers aims to explore the patterns of residential mobility among early retirees mining workers in one of these Spanish regions. Specifically, the municipality of As Pontes de García Rodríguez, located in the Autonomous Community of Galicia. There, the largest opencast coalmine in Spain and its power plant was located. Its construction and operation as of 1979 and the associated influx of newcomers workers would definitely change a place that by that time was not far from many others villages that form the most genuine rural Galicia. In hardly two decades, this boom scenario will soon give way to a deep shrinkage process. The closure of the adjacent opencast coalmine, its conversion into an artificial lake, as well as the massive early retirement plan implemented in the last decades, finally defined its particular idiosyncrasies up to date. The mining industry workforce was nearly 2,000 employees in 1998. It is estimated that the early retirement plan implemented between 1998 and 2012 meant the withdrawal from the labour market of around 1.855 employees between 47 and 64 years old. How many and where early retirees moved? What variables better explain such decision? This paper aims to answer these questions, while also reflecting about revitalization policies in European post-mining regions. Methodology A self-administrated postal questionnaire survey has been conducted. The relatively high response rate (18%) has allowed obtaining a representative sample of 327 cases to be analysed by mean statistic software. With a confidence interval of 95% and p=q=50% (hypothesis of the maximum possible variation), the maximum sample error is ± 4.9% (assuming the number of early-retirees [1855] as the total population. The questionnaire includes opinion (perception of the social integration in the mining community during their time as employees, Retirement Satisfaction Inventory variables (F. J. Floyd et al, 1992), among others), behavioural (social capital related questions, medical treatment for anxiety, current municipality of residence and others) and attribute variable (birthplace and origin related questions and other socio-demographic variables). Different statistical association test according to variable nature (mainly Chi square, Cramer´s V and regression coefficient) were applied in order to identify statistically significant relationships between the different variables. Results Approximately 75% of respondents had resided in the town of As Pontes during most of the time they were employed at the mine, 10% would had done it only at specific times and 14% never, i.e., their place of residence was other than the workplace. Of those who resided most of the time in As Pontes, 28% decided to emigrate after retirement. This decision does not appear to have any statistically significant relationship with most of the variables. Only two variables seem to be associated. First and foremost, the origin. The percentage of former employees who decided to emigrate after retiring is much higher among newcomers from other municipalities, and above all, among those coming from outside the Autonomous Community of Galicia. Here the percentage increases to 48%, against the 12% of natives residents.  However, the destination is not precisely the place of origin. In most of the cases, the respondents reside in a third place within Autonomous Community of Galicia. Thus, 55% do it in nearby urban or coastal areas, especially the city of A Coruña and its metropolitan area. And this is even clearer among those coming from other Autonomous Communities. On the other hand, there is a striking moderate but significant association between the residence and such variable as being or having been under anxiety or depression medical treatment. It is more likely among people who no longer reside in As Pontes. Specifically, 22% of those who have left As Pontes were under treatment in comparison to 10% of the total sample and the 15% of the total Spanish population, according to experts. Conclusions Despite no problem of social integration was identified during the time living in the mining community, evidence suggests that the lower attachment to the community explain the higher tendency to emigrate after retirement among newcomers miners. The fact that the main destination was not the place of origin but a third place suggests that the decision making process may be based on such factors as perception of more urban areas as provider of greater standard of living and services availability. This fact, however, could explain greater problems in the post-retirement adaptation process, judging by the worse health status identified among those who left the community.  The improvement of local services, and especially for retired population, must be seen as an important factor of economic revitalization in post mining regions. The capacity to keep and even attract retirees with usually high level of purchase may reactivate the local economy; especially when other revitalization measures such as tax breaking and grants to attract investors does not seem to be giving the expected results.